# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Preface**  
IX

**Introduction**  
XIII

I. Sense of belonging as a problem of multicultural society  
1  
1. Multiculturalism as an approach to multicultural society  
1  
1.1 Charles Taylor  
1  
1.2 Will Kymlicka  
7  
2. Sense of belonging as a task of multicultural society  
16  
2.1 Susan Mendus  
17  
2.2 Michael Ignatieff  
22  
3. Horizontal relations  
28  
3.1 Requirement of horizontal relations with others for belonging to the whole society  
28  
3.2 Sympathy as an approach to the problem of the sense of belonging to a society  
32

II. Adam Smith’s sympathy and society: sympathy as a necessary condition for a society  
35  
1. The character of Smith’s concept of sympathy  
35  
1.1 A description of Smith’s concept of sympathy  
37  
1.1.1 Definition and features of sympathy  
38  
1.1.2 Sympathy and moral judgement  
40  
1.1.3 Sympathy and fellow-feeling  
44  
1.2 Characteristics of Smith’s concept of sympathy  
48  
1.2.1 Smith’s ‘sympathy’ and Francis Hutcheson’s ‘innate benevolence’  
48  
1.2.2 Smith’s ‘cognitive sympathy’ and David Hume’s ‘law of sympathy’  
53  
2. Smith’s sympathy and society  
59  
2.1 How sympathy, for Smith, makes the ‘same and different’ possible simultaneously: the compatibility of self-love and altruism  
60
2.1.1 The dynamic mechanism for the transformation of self-interest into public good 61
2.1.2 The problem of virtue and vice 64
2.1.3 Smith's sympathy and Amartya Sen's sympathy and commitment 68

2.2 Sympathy as a medium of 'many and one' 72
2.2.1 Justice of Smith and Hume: fellow-feeling or Utility 72
2.2.2 Society as emotion 83
2.2.3 Fellow-feeling as a necessary sentiment for society 89

2.3 Historical aspects of Smith's theory and its application to today's multicultural society 100
2.3.1 Smith's question and his answer to it 101
2.3.2 The difference between Smith's time and today and the significance of his theory 105

III. The significance of Smith's sympathy for today's multicultural society 111
1. The community unit and multicultural society: the compatibility of sympathy with self-love and altruism 111
1.1 Content and significance of Michael Sandel's communitarianism 112
1.2 Some criticisms of Sandel and the task ahead 116
1.3 Criticism of Sandel from Smith's perspective of sympathy and the possibility of a response to multicultural society 120

2. Citizenship and the politics of daily life: sympathy as fellow-feeling 125
2.1 The expansion and deepening of citizenship 126
2.2 Citizenship as radical democracy 130
2.2.1 Chantal Mouffe's theory of citizenship 130
2.2.2 The demand of sympathy for a fair understanding of 'political' in multicultural society 133
2.3 Recognition as the principle of equal citizenship and sympathy 137
2.3.1 Hegel's theory of recognition 137
2.3.2 A problem with Hegel's theory of recognition 140
2.3.3 Hegel's theory of recognition and Smith's theory of sympathy 145
2.4 The significance of sympathy as fellow-feeling in society 147
2.4.1 The role and the limit of law in multicultural society 147
2.4.2 Problems of the lack of sympathy as fellow-feeling 149
2.4.3 Self-esteem and self-respect as a public problem 159

3. Sympathy as a foundation of citizenship of multicultural society 163
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV. Sympathy and the possibility of mutual understanding in multicultural society</th>
<th>169</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Smith’s sympathy as moral naturalism</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Smith’s sympathy as cognitive naturalism</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Smith’s sympathy mediated by cognition</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The possibility of understanding as a condition for cognitive naturalism</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Problems of incommensurability of value for sympathy</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 Problems of incommensurability of value and relativism for sympathy</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 Levels of incommensurability of values</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Conceptual incommensurability</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 Winch’s incommensurability of concepts</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 Criticisms of Winch and the nature of concepts</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3 Another criticism of Winch on the level of difference between cultures</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Possibility of understanding through infiltration</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1 Tacit knowledge and its character: understanding language in a broad sense from tacit knowledge</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2 The possibility of acquiring tacit knowledge by infiltration</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3 The relative view of the status of language from a tacit knowledge perspective and possibility of understanding</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The process of formation of the self and the possibility of moral naturalism</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Society as a source of the self and the acquisition of roles through exchanges of attitudes</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 The sharing of attitudes that connect understanding and sentiment</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The relation of incommensurability of meanings and incommensurability of values</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Conditions for enabling sympathy in reality</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Communication at the social level</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 How the view of others is opened on the social level</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1 Stereotypes</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2 Prejudice</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.3 The required direction for sympathy</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V. Policies for promoting sympathy in multicultural society</th>
<th>243</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Roles of sympathy in multicultural society</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Sympathy as an epistemological criterion of multicultural society</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VIII SYMPATHY AS A FOUNDATION OF MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

1.2 Needs of maintaining multicultural society 250
   1.2.1 The need for public intervention 252
   1.2.2 The need for indirect methods 253

2. When should sympathy stop? 255

3. Promotion of communication as a condition for sympathy 260
   3.1 The reality of communication 260
   3.2 A requirement of communication from the point of sympathy 262

4. The mass media as a means for securing sympathy 265
   4.1 Representation of others and the mass media 265
   4.2 The mass media as a mediator of negative social relations 270
   4.3 Institution of representation of others as a condition of sympathy: censorship and checks and balances 272

5. Proposal for policies to promote sympathy and fellow-feeling 276
   5.1 Legal and administrative policy 276
      5.1.1 Race relations legislation in Britain: an example of constructing a legal and administrative framework for a multicultural society 276
      5.1.2 Legitimacy and the limits of censorship 278
      5.1.3 Equal opportunities for participation and representation 280
   5.2 Activities of local councils and NGOs 281
   5.3 Other activities of NGOs, educators and individuals 284

Conclusion 287
   1. The significance of Adam Smith’s argument for us 287
   2. Further tasks 291

References 293
Index 309